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Abstract 
The paper examines how flows of foreign aid have reacted to events of democratization in 
developing countries. Using a panel dataset of 136 aid receiving countries between 1980 and 
2009, aid allocation regressions reveal that donors in general have tended to react to visible, 
major democratic transitions by increasing aid to the partner country, but no significant 
increases can be identified in case of countries introducing smaller democratic reforms. The 
increases in aid flows are not sustained over time, implying that donors do not provide long 
term support to nascent democracies. Also, democratizations in Sub-Saharan Africa do not 
seem to have been rewarded with higher levels of aid. 
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Are democratizing countries ‘rewarded’ with higher levels of foreign aid? 
 
1. Introduction 
Spreading the values of democracy, the respect for human rights and civil liberties, as well as 
democratic governance have become integral parts of the foreign strategies and external 
assistance policies of several large donors in the past decade. Donors increasingly use 
political conditionality attached to foreign aid and also put a large emphasis on supporting 
development projects in partner countries that may directly impact and improve the quality of 
democracy. Political conditionality comes in several forms, but most generally it involves 
providing positive incentives, such as increased aid flows to countries undertaking democratic 
reforms. Such conditionality may be rather explicit in donor-recipient dialogues, but an 
implicit theme is also identifiable in the external assistance policies of donors like the United 
States or the European Community: more democratic countries ‘deserve’ more foreign aid, as 
aid may be more effective in a democratic settings, not to mention the moral problems of 
supporting countries with non-democratic ruling elites. Nascent democracies in developing 
countries may also be in need of external resources for building institutions and supporting 
state expenditure, as in the long run the new polities can only gain popular support by 
providing public services, as well as ensuring economic growth and the creation of jobs. The 
possibility of increased aid flows after an event of democratic change may induce local elites 
to undertake certain democratic reforms, but also provide rival elites an incentive to take over 
the state and introduce democracy. Thus, providing credible commitments on increasing aid 
flows to democratizers can contribute to the democracy promotion, as well as the aid 
effectiveness agendas of many donors. 
 
This paper addresses the question of just how credible such promises may be in the case of the 
OECD DAC donors, in light of their previous performance. Specifically, it examines how aid 
flows between 1980 and 2009 have reacted to events of democratic change and whether 
countries introducing democratic reforms were actually ‘rewarded’ with increased flows of 
foreign aid. The policy relevance of this issue is rather straightforward: if donors have been 
consistent in rewarding democratic change in developing countries in the past, then any 
commitment to increase aid to new democracies in the future may seem more credible. The 
issue is especially relevant in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions in North Africa 
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and the Middle East. Will the consolidation of the emerging political systems in countries like 
Egypt, Tunisia or Libya be supported with increased levels of foreign aid? 
 
Estimating aid allocation regressions on a panel dataset of 136 aid receiving countries, the 
paper finds that on average donors do seem to increase aid to countries which undergo a 
democratic transition. In fact, much of the variation in aid flows relating to the level of 
democracy can be explained by democratic changes within countries as opposed to 
differences in levels of democracy across countries. The results also indicate that on average 
donors increase aid to countries experiencing major democratic transitions, but there is no 
evidence that they reward smaller democratic changes. These results seem encouraging, but 
there is a downside: donors do not seem to be committed to providing longer term support to 
new democracies, and increased aid flows trail off a few years after the transition. The paper 
thus adds to the literature on aid allocation by refining our understanding of how the level of 
democracy and democratic change influence the allocation decisions of donors, an issue 
which so far has only been marginally studied. An important methodological contribution of 
the paper is the disaggregation of democracy into differences between countries and changes 
within countries, which can provide a more refined understanding of donor behaviour.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the literature on aid 
allocation and the relationship between aid and democracy. The third section presents the 
methodology of the paper and the baseline regression model. Section four discusses the 
empirical results and tests them for robustness, while section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Aid and democracy 
The relationship between the amount of foreign aid a country receives and the level of 
democracy within that country is one of two-way causality. The level of democracy can be a 
determinant of how much aid is allocated to a country, but aid can also have an impact on 
democracy in the recipient. This section starts by reviewing the former channel, i.e. the results 
and approaches of the literature on aid allocation in order to provide a broader theoretical 
framework for the econometric analysis, and then briefly assesses the literature on the impact 
of aid on democracy as well. 
 
The quantitative aid allocation literature has long traditions, dating back to the works of 
McKinley and Little (1977; 1979) as well as Maizels and Nissanke (1984). Most studies in the 
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field group the determinants of aid allocation into three basic categories: donor interests, 
recipient needs, and more recently, recipient merit (McGillivray 2003; Hoeffler and Outram 
2011). The broad (and more or less consensual) conclusions of the literature can be 
summarized in three points: 
1. Donor interest variables seem to be most important in explaining how much aid a 
country gets (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
2. In the decades after the Cold War, and especially in the years since the turn of 
Millennium, recipient need and merit variables seem to have gained in relative 
importance, signalling a shift in the determinants of donor behaviour (Dollar and 
Levine 2006; Isopi and Mavrotas 2006; Claessens et al. 2009). 
3. Donor allocation behaviour can be rather heterogeneous: there are clear differences 
between donors, with some being more selective or altruistic than others (Schraeder et 
al. 1998; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Dollar and Levine 2006; Berthélemy 2006). 
 
These three points aside, studies have identified a whole range of specific variables that 
impact donor aid allocation decisions. In case of donor interests, political variables like 
colonial past, voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (Alesina and Dollar 
2000) or the Cold War (Hoeffler and Outram 2011) have been shown to influence aid 
allocation. Economic donor self interest also has explanatory power. Maizels and Nissanke 
(1984) for example argued that the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the recipient 
country is an important determinant, while Younas (2008) proved that developing countries 
which import more manufactured goods, mostly produced by high income countries, also 
receive higher amounts of aid.  
 
Recipient need variables have mostly taken the back seat, as opposed to donor interests. 
However, per capita income and infant mortality, signifying the financial and psychical needs 
of recipient countries respectively, have been shown to be significant determinants of aid in 
some studies (Trumbull and Wall 1994; Wall 1995), with their importance growing in more 
recent ones (Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2006; Dollar and Levine 2006).  
 
Recipient merit is usually understood in terms of how the partner country performs either in 
economic terms or in some other issue such as institutional quality, democratic governance, 
the quality of democracy or the respect for civil liberties and human rights. The underlying 
logic of recipient merit variables is that better performing countries should receive higher 
5 
 
amounts of aid, a conclusion underpinned by advances in the aid effectiveness literature. In 
the early 2000s, a large body of literature found evidence that aid is more effective in certain 
contexts than others. These contexts mainly refer to ‘good’ policies (Burnside and Dollar 
2000), economic institutions (Burnside and Dollar 2004; Collier and Dollar 2002), but also to 
political systems. Boone (1996) argued that the impact of aid is greater in liberal political 
regimes, and Svensson (1999) echoed this conclusion with results showing that the long run 
growth impact of aid is conditional on the respect for political rights and civil liberties in a 
country. Kosack (2003) concluded that the level of democracy in a country is the main 
determinant of how effective aid is in terms of alleviating poverty. While many of these 
results have been debated (Hansen and Tarp 2001; Easterly et al. 2004; Dovern and 
Nunnenkamp 2007), the conclusion emerges that if donor countries wish to maximize the 
impact of their resource transfers on growth or poverty reduction, one path could be to give 
more aid to those countries which have better quality policies, as well as better economic and 
more democratic political institutions.  
 
Measuring institutional quality however raises several questions, as indices measuring them 
are inherently subjective, and often not available in longer time series. Therefore, many 
papers have opted to proxy institutional or policy quality with an output side measure, most 
commonly the economic growth rate of the country (Berthélemy 2006; Berthélemy and Tichit 
2004; Hoeffler and Outram 2011). Still, there are numerous examples of papers using indices 
that measure the quality of economic and political institutions directly, such as the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) measure (Dollar and Levine 
2006), or the Governance Matters indicators, also published by the World Bank (Kaufmann et 
al. 2009; Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2006). Alesina and Dollar (2000) use Freedom House’s 
civil liberties and political rights indices and conclude that being more democratic has a 
significant though rather small effect on aggregate aid flows from all donors. This result has 
been supported by Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006), and also for many individual donors by 
Neumayer (2003a) and Hoeffler and Outram (2011), the later using the Polity IV index 
instead of the Freedom House measure. It therefore seems that there is a significant and robust 
relationship between the level of democracy and the amount of aid a country gets.  
 
There is however an important limitation in these results: it is not clear how much they are 
driven by cross country differences in levels of democracy and how much by within country 
changes (i.e. events of democratic change). Alesina and Dollar (2000) have tried to address 
6 
 
this question by simply comparing aid flows before and after an episode of democratization 
for individual countries, but this approach clearly cannot tell us much on the ceteris paribus 
effect of an event of democratization on aid flows. Therefore, the existing literature offers no 
clear answer on whether a democratizing country can expect larger volumes of aggregate aid 
or not. This paper attempts to address this issue by disaggregating the measure of democracy 
into a level component and a change component (see the following section for more details) 
and providing ceteris paribus estimates of the effects of democratic changes on aid flows. 
 
As mentioned, donors are not the same, and have different motivations for giving aid, 
different organizational structures, methods of delivery etc. These differences are well 
documented in qualitative donor studies (Hoebink and Stokke 2005; Lancaster 2006). Some 
donors, like the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, the European Commission or the World Bank 
clearly place emphasis on supporting countries that have better quality institutions, higher 
level of respect for human rights and ‘freer’ political systems. Others, such as France, Japan 
or Belgium have embraced political selectivity to a much smaller degree (Berthélemy 2006). 
There is evidence however that since the mid-1990s, many donors have become increasingly 
selective in their aid allocations, pointing to some degree of convergence among donor 
practices (Dollar and Levine 2006).  
 
The literature on the reverse causal issue, i.e. the impact of aid on democracy is also briefly 
summarized. The boom in the aid effectiveness literature in the early to mid-2000s has also 
produced several empirical papers on whether aid promotes or hinders democracy, but the 
question is far from settled as more recent papers show. 
 
Theory on the impact of aid on democracy is inconclusive, as there are both arguments that 
aid can promote democracy, but also erode it. Aid can promote democracy through three 
channels (Knack 2004; Heckelman 2010): (1) through technical assistance aimed specifically 
at improving democratic practices, such as the electoral process, strengthening the judiciary or 
promoting civil society (democracy aid); (2) through political conditionality attached to aid; 
and (3) through improving education and increasing per capita income, both of which may be 
conducive to democracy. On the other hand, aid can harm democracy by eroding democratic 
governance (Knack 2001; Brautigam and Knack 2004; Busse and Gröning 2009) through 
channels like decreasing the need of local elites to raise revenues through taxation (Moss et 
al. 2006), inducing greater rent seeking among elites (Svensson 2000), overburdening state 
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bureaucracies with related administrative requirements (Knack and Rahman 2007), or by 
releasing governments from binding revenue constraints (Janus 2009).  
 
In light of these conflicting theoretical considerations, it is not surprising that the empirical 
literature has yielded rather mixed results on the effects of aid on democracy or on the various 
institutions that are associated with democracy. Knack (2004) finds no evidence that aid in 
general supports democratization, while Djankov et al. (2008) report an outright negative 
relationship between aid and the level of democracy. These findings are echoed by Kalyvitis 
and Vlachaki (2012), although they add that the negative relationship is moderated when aid 
flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Dutta et al. (2013) argue that aid strengthens 
the existing political system it encounters regardless of its nature, thus aid has no power to 
promote democracy in dictatorships. Kono and Montinola (2009) show that foreign aid 
cumulated over time will promote the survival of autocratic leaders. The more optimistic 
papers conclude that aid may promote democracy, but only under some circumstances. 
Wright (2009) for example argues that dictators who have a large chance of remaining in 
power after democratization tend to respond to aid by democratizing, but otherwise aid will 
have no impact. Bermeo (2011) finds that aid provided by democratic donors increases the 
likelihood of democratic transition. This is good news, as most aid comes from democratic 
donors, although non-democracies like China are also increasingly important providers of aid 
(Tarrósy 2012). Kangoye (2011) concludes that aid can offset the negative effects terms of 
trade shocks may have on the quality of democracy, and Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2011), as 
well as Dietrich and Wright (2013) find evidence that levels of democracy aid are positively 
correlated with the likelihood of democratic regime change.  
 
Summing up this section it seems that the causality running from democracy to aid allocation 
is stronger than the impact of aid on democracy, which is heavily contingent on recipient and 
donor context.  The following section discusses the methodological issues and presents the 
dataset used. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Model and data 
In order to examine how events of democratization influence the amount of aid a country 
receives, the paper estimates a standard ‘donor interest, recipient need, recipient merit’ model 
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on a panel of aid receiving countries for the years between 1980 and 2009.
3
 The observations 
are grouped into three year averages in order to smooth out large annual fluctuations in aid 
data. This is a reasonable compromise, as it still ensures a rather large number of 
observations: with 136 countries and 10 three year periods, the dataset includes 1,360 
maximum potential observations, but in practice this number is limited by data availability. 
The panel is unbalanced. 
 
The baseline panel equation is the following: 
 
ln(ODAcapit) = 0 + 1demit-1 + 2dem_levit-2 +3Nit-1 + 4Mit-1 + 5Dit-1 + t + i + it  (1) 
 
The dependent variable, ODAcapit measures the total amount of aid a country receives from 
all donors. Specifically, disbursements of net official development assistance (ODA) or 
official assistance (OA) are used, minus humanitarian aid, in constant 2005 US dollars and 
per capita.
4
 The data is from the OECD (2012), thus it only includes aid from the donors 
which are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and does not 
include non-DAC aid from emerging donors like China or some Arab states. The independent 
variables in equation (1) are the following: 
 dem: an event of democratization; 
 demlev: the level of democracy in a country; 
 N: vector of variables measuring recipient need; 
 M: vector of variables measuring recipient merit; 
 D: vector of variables measuring donor interest; 
 : vector of time fixed effects 
 : vector of country fixed effects. 
 
Democracy is thus measured by two variables, a ‘change’ variable and a ‘level’ variable. 
Through this disaggregation technique, it is possible measure the effect of events of 
democratic change and levels of democracy and thus account for differences across countries 
                                                          
3
 1980 was selected as the starting year to ensure some degree of comparability with other aid allocation studies, 
as many use this year as their first observation (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Isopi and Mavrotas 2006; Hoeffler 
and Outram 2011). Although political conditionality and selective aid allocation criteria where not emphasized 
by donors during the Cold War, this can be easily controlled for in the regressions. 
4
 Data on ODA disbursements are used as opposed to ODA commitments, as disbursements are a better indicator 
of what donors actually end up doing. As events of democratization may often be unexpected events, donor 
reactions to these may not be captured in data on commitments. 
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and through time. In the baseline model, both variables are derived from the ‘Polity’ index 
from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2011). The Polity index measures the level of 
autocracy and democracy on a scale of 20, where scores of -10 to 0 denote an autocracy, 1 to 
6 a partial democracy and 7 to 10 a full democracy. The indicator has been re-scaled to a scale 
of 0 to 20. 
 
The level variable, ‘dem_lev’ is the Polity score of the country, and it is lagged two periods in 
the regressions. The main independent variable of interest however is the change variable, 
‘dem’, which is a dummy variable equalling 1 if an event of democratic change began in the 
recipient country in the given three year period. The variable is lagged one period in the 
regressions. It is necessarily arbitrary to provide an operationalized definition of an event of 
democratic change. In the baseline model, three different definitions for the change variable 
are used, all adapted from the definitions of democratic changes used in the Polity IV dataset. 
An episode of ‘major democratic transition’ is understood as an increase in the country’s 
Polity score of six or more points which also involves a shift from one of the three categories 
above to another, i.e. from autocracy to partial democracy or full democracy, or from partial 
democracy to full democracy (variable major_dem). The second definition, an episode of 
‘positive regime change’ involves a three points or larger increase in the Polity score, without 
necessarily leading to a shift in categories (small_dem). The third definition, ‘any event of 
democratic change’, simply refers to either of the two above (any_dem). By using these three 
definitions it is not only possible to examine how aid flows to new democracies change, but it 
is also possible to gauge whether autocracies that open their political systems to a certain 
extent, but stop short of meaningful democratization, can count on an increase in inflows of 
foreign aid. 
 
An alternative operationalization of democratic change is also used to test for robustness. The 
definitions above are not only arbitrary, but also bundle conceptually different types of 
democratic changes together. A shift in a country’s Polity score from -10 to -7 is different 
than a shift from -2 to +1. The alternative democratization variable, ‘multiparty’, is also a 
dummy, and focuses on the occurrence of multiparty elections, based on data and definitions 
in Cheibub et al. (2010) and Dietrich and Wright (2013). Its value is 1 if the country holds 
multiparty elections resulting in real opposition parties present in an elected legislature for the 
first time ever, or after a previous breakdown of democracy. This variable captures only 
regime changes from autocracy to some form (partial or full) of democracy, and it is much 
10 
 
more directly observable for donors than most other forms of democratic change (Dietrich and 
Wright 2013). 
 
Two variables on recipient need are included. Per capita GDP in purchasing power parity is 
included as a proxy for the financial need of the country and the level of poverty (variable 
ppp_gdpcap). This variable however can be an imperfect indicator of the country’s actual 
need, as it does not take into account the distribution of income. Following Trumbull and 
Wall (1994) and Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006), a second variable, infant mortality rate per 
1,000 live births is also entered which can proxy the physical need of a recipient (inf_mort). 
 
Besides the two democracy variables elaborated above, two further variables are used to 
measure recipient merit. First, annual GDP growth (gdp_growth) is included as an output side 
performance measure (following Berthélemy 2006; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Hoeffler and 
Outram 2011). Second, a simple measure of openness, the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP is used in order to proxy ‘good policies’, as an input side performance measure. While it 
has been widely debated in the literature that openness is a rather crude measure for policy 
quality (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001), it is the only indicator which is available for a large 
range of countries and in long time series. Other widely used measures of policies and 
institutions are the World Bank’s CPIA and Governance Matters datasets, the pre-2005 data 
of the former however are only available to World Bank researchers, and the latter is only 
available since 1996. A third source of institutional quality measures is the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is available since 1984, but only for a rather small group 
of countries. Neither of the above measures are therefore suitable, and one must make do with 
the imperfect openness measure. None the less, the ‘investment profile’ index from the ICRG 
is used in robustness checks.  
 
Operationalizing donor interests on the aggregate level can be difficult as different donors 
have different interests and finding suitable proxies on the aggregate level under analysis can 
be difficult. In case of political interests, it has been argued (see for example Alesina and 
Dollar 2000) that donors give more aid to former colonies, thus a dummy to indicate whether 
a country was a colony of any OECD DAC donor after 1900 is included (variable colony). As 
a further measure of political donor interests, dummies for various regions are also included, 
namely for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin-America, the Middle East and North Africa, and 
Europe (and thus Asian countries represent the baseline; variables africa, latin_am, mena and 
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europe respectively). These dummies can proxy the special interests that some donors have 
towards specific regions, such as the United States towards Latin America, or the European 
countries towards Africa. Dummy variables are also added for two well-known outliers, Israel 
and Egypt (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Economic donor interests are proxied with two 
variables: the stock of FDI relative to GDP in the country (variable fdi_stock; Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984; Berthélemy 2006), as well as the imports of the recipient from high income 
countries, again compared to GDP (variable hi_inc_imports; Younas 2008). 
 
One further control variable, the level of population in the recipient country is also added to 
account for the fact that less populous countries can receive higher per capita amounts of aid 
due to the high fixed costs of development cooperation. Time dummies for each three year 
period are also used. Several further variables are used for robustness checks, but these are 
discussed in the following section. All nominal price and exchange rate data have been 
converted to constant 2005 dollars. The dependent variable, as well as per capita GDP and 
population are entered in natural logarithm. All variables are taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2012), with the exception of the 
dependent variable, which is from the OECD (2012), and the democracy variables from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2011), Cheibub et al. (2010) and Dietrich and Wright 
(2013). 
 
3.2. Estimation issues 
A major problem in estimating aid allocation equations like (1) is endogenity, resulting 
mainly from two-way causation between aid and most of the independent variables, a case 
illustrated with aid and democracy in the previous section. Sadly, there is no perfect method 
for dealing with this problem. One possibility is to lag the independent variables, which may 
allow capturing their effects in time on the dependent variable. This also makes sense from an 
economic point of view, as donors most likely make aid allocation decisions based on data 
from previous years. Another possibility is to use instrumental variables techniques, but the 
main problem here is that so far no variables have been identified that can serve as good 
instruments, and in fact it is unlikely that they even exist. 
 
When estimating equation (1), the independent variables are entered as first lags and the 
democratization ‘level’ variable as a second lag as discussed in section 3.1., as a solution for 
treating endogenity. However, the problem of endogenity in the relationship between aid and 
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democratic change is mitigated to some extent by one further issue. It can be argued that the 
main independent variable of interest, an event of democratic change, is actually rather 
exogenous to aid flows. While the level of democracy in a country may not be fully 
exogenous to aid flows, an event of democratic change is. The timing of an event of 
democratization often depends on random events like riots against police brutality, or 
democratization spilling over from neighbouring countries. The Arab spring revolutions show 
this well: in Tunisia the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ began due to Mohamed Bouazizi’s self 
immolation in response to police abuse, sparking riots among a population already upset due 
to rising food prices. The example of Tunisia quickly spread to other Arab countries, leading 
to political change in Egypt and Libya.  
 
Concerning estimation methods, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that almost all 
econometric methods have been tried in the aid allocation literature, ranging from simple and 
pooled OLS (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Wall 1995; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 
2003b; Dollar and Levin 2006; Younas 2008) through more sophisticated panel methods like 
fixed effects (Trumbull and Wall 1994; Neumayer 2003c; Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2006) 
and random effects (Neumayer 2003c) to instrumental variable panel methods like 2SLS with 
fixed effects, although only for a special case where instruments were actually available 
(Chauvet 2002). Papers using bilateral aid flows instead of aggregate aid flows must also cope 
with the censored nature of the dependent variable, as not all countries receive aid from every 
donor. Berthélemy (2006) for example recommends using either a Tobit model or two step 
methods like Heckmann estimation in these cases. This is however not an issue in the current 
case of using aggregate aid flows from all donors, as basically every country in the dataset 
receives some amount of aid in every three year period. There were only five recipient-
periods (out of the potential dataset of 1,360 observations) which did not receive any aid, in 
these cases a minuscule amount of 0.01 million dollars divided by the country’s population 
was added. It is unlikely that this would bias the results. 
 
To ensure the robustness of results, equation (1) is estimated with three different methods. 
First, pooled OLS is used, which is clearly not an ideal method for estimating panel equations, 
but it can serve as useful baseline. Second, the equation is estimated with random effects, 
which is suited to the panel nature of the data and allows the estimation of time invariant 
variables. However, random effects assumes that the time-invariant country effects are 
orthogonal to the error term, an assumption which is most likely not valid. Thus, the third 
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(and preferred) method is the fixed effects panel estimator, which can control for time-
invariant donor political and strategic interests by first-differencing the equation (Trumbull 
and Wall 1994). The downside of fixed effects is that the effects of the time-invariant 
variables cannot be estimated, but none of these variables are of primary interest in this case.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset includes 73 events of major democratic transitions, 47 positive regime changes, 
and 111 events which satisfy the conditions of the multiparty elections control variable. The 
geographic and temporal distribution of major democratic transitions and positive regime 
changes is shown in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows how average levels of aid per capita changed during and after these democratic 
transitions, again in regional breakdown. The table uses the three year averages approach 
described in Section 3. ‘Before’ and ‘after’ averages represent three year periods before and 
after a three year period during which an event of democratic change began. Data for each 
three year ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ period were averaged across regions, using country 
populations as weights. The resulting stylized data indicate that donors may have reacted 
differently to democratizations in different regions. Both types of democratic changes were 
followed by increases in aid in Europe and Latin-America, and major transitions were also 
rewarded in Asia. The strong changes in aid to European countries are actually even 
downplayed by the data, as many countries which gained their independence in parallel to 
becoming democratic (such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia etc.) are not 
included in the data. Neither type of democratization however was followed by higher aid per 
capita levels in Sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle-East and North Africa.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
One should however not draw any strong conclusions based on the data in Table 2. Simple 
before-after data can be powerful, but also misleading as they do not account for the effects of 
other factors. Democratic transitions may be accompanied by a strong recession (as was the 
case in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s), increasing poverty, or violent conflict, 
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each of which may have an impact on aid flows. Also, even though the regional averages may 
suggest otherwise, there are examples in the data of cases even in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
donors have increased aid flows after an event of democratization (such as Zambia in 1991). 
In addition, the three year averages may hide some changes in aid, as donors may react much 
more quickly to democratic changes. 
 
Coefficients of correlation between the main dependent variable and the independent 
variables are shown in Table 3. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2. Results and sensitivity analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the baseline model in equation (1) and also includes 
some sensitivity tests. Model 1 estimates the equation using pooled OLS. Looking first at the 
main variable of interest, an event of any democratic change is significant and its coefficient 
is economically meaningful, as it implies that a country undertaking democratic reforms can, 
ceteris paribus, expect an approximately 26% increase in aid per capita. The level of 
democracy is also significant, showing that more democratic countries receive more aid, 
although not much more: a 1 point improvement on the Polity scale implies a modest 2.5% 
increase in aid. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The pooled OLS model also confirms some basic expectations and previous findings of the 
literature. GDP per capita and the population of the recipient country are both highly 
significant. The openness variable is also a significant determinant of aid per capita flows. 
The trade variable turns out significant too, implying that those countries that import more 
from high income countries also get more aid. The FDI stock variable on the other hand is 
significant but with a negative sign, which means that FDI and aid are rather substitutes to 
each other. Countries with higher FDI stocks will receive lower per capita aid. These results 
indicate that economic donor self interests may be at play in case of trade, but not in case of 
FDI. 
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As explained above, pooled OLS is not the best estimator. In order to mitigate the bias caused 
by unobserved country effects to some extent, model 1 also includes dummy variables for 
these fixed effects, as outlined in Section 3. The regional dummies are significant for the 
relatively higher income regions, Europe, Latin-America and the Middle East and North 
Africa. Interestingly, the dummy on colonial past is not significant, a finding which 
contradicts some of the previous literature (such as Alesina and Dollar 2000). The most likely 
reason for this contradiction is the different time periods used in the analyses. As the panel in 
this paper includes data up to 2009, it may be possible that the gradual shift away from giving 
disproportional amounts of aid to former colonies by donors like France and the UK, apparent 
since the late 1990s (Pacquement 2010), dominates the data. 
 
Model 2 uses the random effects estimator. The significance of the democratic change 
variable increases in this model and its coefficient practically remains the same. The level of 
democracy is still significant, although only at the 10% level. The significance of some other 
variables also changes in the random effects model, the Latin-America and North Africa and 
Middle East dummies, as well as the variable on imports from high income countries are no 
longer significant. 
 
In model 3 the preferred fixed effects estimator is used. A Hausmann test confirms that fixed 
effects is indeed a better estimator tan random effects (χ² = 56.24, p = 0.00). The model 
confirms the findings of the previous models for the democratic change variable. There is 
however one important change. The level of democracy variable now loses its significance. 
This result can indicate that donors do not actually give more aid to more democratic 
countries, but they do increase aid to countries undergoing democratic change. This can also 
imply that previous results in the literature on the significance of the level of democracy were 
driven by changes in democracy within countries rather than differences across countries.  
 
In order to check the robustness of the results in model 3, several further control variables 
were introduced that may influence donor allocation decisions. Models 4 to 7 include these 
tests. In model 4, a variable on the investment profile of the recipient country is introduced, 
taken from ICRG (variable inv_pro). This measure includes assessments on the rule of law in 
a country, the risk of expropriation and the viability of contracts, and thus can be thought of as 
an indicator of the quality of economic institutions in the country. It is measured on a scale of 
0 to 12, with higher numbers representing a less risky investment environment. The downside 
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of the indicator however is that it’s time series is only available from 1984 and covers a lower 
number of countries, thus greatly reducing the number of observations in the model. Despite 
this problem, the results on the democratic change variable do not change, and the inv_pro 
variable is insignificant. The variable on openness however loses its significance, which is 
likely due to the fact that it is highly correlated with the new variable and the estimator is not 
able to sufficiently differentiate between their effects. In model 5, a variable measuring the 
intensity of civilian and international conflicts in a recipient is introduced, taken from 
Marshall (2012). This variable is not significant either and does not alter the results. Model 6 
adds a variable on military expenditures per GDP from the World Development Indicators, 
which again greatly reduces the number of observations, causing the FDI and openness 
variables to lose their significance. However, the new variable is not significant and it does 
not affect the significance of the democratic change variable. Finally, in model 7 an 
interaction variable between the democratic change dummy and a dummy for the period of 
the Cold War is included. The logic of this is that donors may have been less sensitive to 
rewarding democratic change during the Cold War, as strategic concerns were more 
dominant. This variable too however is insignificant and does not change the results. 
 
Model 8 uses same specification as in model 3, but with the alternative measure for 
democratic change, i.e. holding multiparty elections for the first time, also lagged one period. 
The multiparty variable is significant, although the size of the coefficient is smaller than that 
of the any_dem variable in model 3. Significance of the other variables does not change. All 
the previous regressions (models 4 to 7) were also re-run with multiparty variable, and it 
turned out significant in all cases (these results are not reported). This indicates that our 
results hold irrespective of how democratization is operationalized.  
 
As a further step in the sensitivity analysis, the variable on democratic change from the Polity 
dataset was broken up according to the two definitions outlined in Section 3, i.e. major 
democratic transitions and positive regime changes. These results are included in model 9 in 
Table 5. The disaggregation of the democratic change variable shows that it is actually the 
major democratic transitions that have been driving the results. Countries undergoing a major 
democratic transition receive a significant increase in per capita aid, while cases of positive 
regime change do not receive significantly more aid. This result shows that donors are more 
likely to support meaningful democratizations than smaller, potentially less visible changes.  
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[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In model 10 another lag for the two democratic change variables is added (and the lag of the 
level of democracy is also increased to account for this) in order to test how committed 
donors are to supporting new democracies in the longer run. The first lag of the major 
democratic change variable remains significant, but the second is not. The lags of the positive 
regime change variables are not significant at all. This result is troubling: donors give more 
aid to new democracies for a few years after their transition begins, but after that aid per 
capita again decreases. Therefore, it seems that donors in general do not commit themselves 
to providing longer term support to new democracies, which are actually highly in need of it. 
This confirms previous results by Carothers (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2006). 
 
An important question concerning the robustness of these results is how appropriate averaging 
the data for three year periods is. Donors may react quickly to an event of democratization 
and the three year averages may hide such reactions. The specification used thus far may not 
be able to capture this. Model 11 therefore uses country-year data instead of the country three 
year averages used so far. Using annual data instead of period averages does have a certain 
risk, as the high annual volatility of aid flows can cause distortions. However, annual data can 
allow to better test the timing of donor reactions and the duration of increased aid. Several lag 
structures have been experimented with and all show similar results, model 11 reports a 
structure with 5 lags. The first four lags of the major democratic change dummy are 
significant with meaningful coefficients. This confirms, but also refines the results of model 
10: donors increase aid to major transitions the year right after the transition begins, and 
sustain higher aid volumes for three further years. Lags beyond the fifth are insignificant 
(these results are not reported, but available upon request), meaning that the support of donors 
trails off 5 years after a democratic transition began. 
 
Model 12 tests whether there are differences in donor reactions to major democratic changes 
across regions, as the descriptive data in Table 2 implied. To do so, it includes four interaction 
variables between the major democratic change dummy and the four regional dummies used 
in models 1 and 2. The non-interacted major democratic transition variable now thus 
measures the baseline, which is Asia. Although at varying levels, but all regional interactions 
and the baseline are significant, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa. Donors therefore 
seem to have rather consistently increased aid to democratizing countries across regions, but 
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have neglected Africa. This is an interesting finding that definitely warrants further study 
beyond the scope of this paper. Problems with governance in Africa were an important reason 
why donors began engaging in political conditionality and selective allocation in the 1990s, 
and democracy aid has clearly increased to the region during that decade (Dietrich and Wright 
2013). This may not be reflected in total aid flows as donors may have responded by changing 
the composition of their aid (however, sectoral data on aid is only available from 1995, which 
makes it difficult to test this hypothesis). The literature on aid sanctions (Crawford 2001; 
Portela 2007) also provides evidence that donors have shown greater care about democracy in 
Africa by rather consistently cutting aid to African countries violating human rights and 
democratic principles. 
 
Model 13 tests this issue of aid sanctions: do donors punish democratic reversal? To measure 
democratic reversal, a new dummy variable is introduced, also based on the Polity IV dataset 
and a similar logic as the democratic change variables. The dummy is equal to 1 if a decrease 
in a country’s Polity score of 3 or more points begins in a given three year period, and is also 
lagged. Again using the three year averages set up, the variable turns out to be significant, 
with a coefficient of a similar magnitude as the major democratic transition variable and with 
a negative sign. This result remains significant even after controlling for the intensity of 
civilian and interstate conflicts, which may have an impact both on democratic reversal and 
levels of foreign aid (model 14). Donors therefore not only reward major democratic change, 
but also punish democratic reversal. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper asked the question whether OECD DAC donors of foreign aid increase their 
assistance to developing countries where an event of democratization happens. The data 
shows an affirmative answer, as in general donors do seem to react positively to democratic 
change. The experience is therefore in-line with the rhetoric of donors, which has been 
emphasizing that democratic countries deserve more aid, both from a moral and an aid-
effectiveness perspective. This general conclusion can also help in giving credibility to the 
promises of increased aid that donors make, implicitly or explicitly, to autocratic or hybrid 
regime countries. More credible promises mean greater incentives for democratic change to 
happen. 
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The analysis has also revealed some issues which nuance these conclusions to some extent. 
First, the greater the extent of democratization, the higher the rewards. Donors tend to give 
more aid to cases where countries introduce visible democratic changes and introduce some, 
not necessarily perfect, form of democracy. Smaller and less visible democratic changes 
however are not followed by significantly higher aid per capita. Second, support to new 
democracies does not imply long term commitment and increased aid flows trail off after a 
few years. Third, the paper has revealed regional variation in the responses of donors, with 
Sub-Saharan African democratizations being the ones which have not received ‘rewards’, 
albeit the composition of aid to the region has most likely changed.  
 
These conclusions are relevant from a normative policy standpoint, at least if one accepts the 
(debated) findings from the literature that aid is more effective in democratic environments. 
Donors need to develop strategies to remain engaged in new democracies in developing 
countries, which are usually in need of external financing to consolidate the new regime and 
build popular support. Further research is needed however to determine the types of aid which 
support this, and the types that do not. Also, as democracy is clearly the most fragile in Africa 
and there are still a large number of hybrid regimes in the region where sham democratic 
practices often serve to legitimize the ruling elite, an increased attention to promoting 
democracy in Africa may be needed. One element of such a strategy can be credible promises 
of increased aid in exchange for democratic reforms.  
 
Of course, aid and democratic conditionality should not be viewed as the best possible 
solution to promote the spread of democracy. It may well be difficult to consolidate 
democracy which is seen as externally imposed. Such conditionality therefore must not be too 
obtrusive, rather just provide soft incentives to support home grown processes and domestic 
actors. As this paper highlighted, the key issue is the credibility of promises of increased aid 
by the donor community. The track record thus far seems promising, but clearly there is room 
for improvement in the details. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Number of major democratic changes and positive regime changes by region and decade 
 Major democratic transitions Positive regime changes 
Total 
1980-1988 1989-2000 2001-2009 1980-1988 1989-2000 2001-2009 
Asia and Oceania 2 7 5 5 1 3 23 
Europe 0 10 0 0 3 1 14 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
1 1 0 2 5 2 11 
Latin-America 8 8 1 2 2 0 21 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 21 7 0 15 6 51 
Total 13 47 13 9 26 12 120 
Note: 1980-88 represents periods 1, 2 and 3; 1989-2000 periods 4, 5, 6 and 7; and 2001-2009 periods 8, 9 and 10 
of the dataset.  
Source: based on Marshall et al. (2011) 
 
Table 2. Average regional aid per capita levels before, during and after democratization episodes (in 
2005 constant dollars and exchange rates) 
 Major democratic transitions Positive regime changes 
Before During After Before During After 
Asia and Oceania 13.2 13.7 15.0 15.7 13.4 13.6 
Europe 3.0 39.3 44.3 29.8 30.6 41.6 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
16.4 6.3 5.6 36.2 32.9 27.1 
Latin-America 7.5 12.9 15.7 17.1 18.3 23.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 46.6 44.4 35.2 43.5 37.4 34.4 
Note: each ‘before, during, after’ period represents three-year population weighted averages. 
Source: calculations of the author based on data from OECD (2012) and Marshall et al. (2011) 
  
25 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of main variables 
 ln_ODA
_cap 
ln_ 
population 
polity inf_ 
mort 
fdi_ 
stock 
openness ln_ppp_ 
gdpcap 
gdp_ 
growth 
ln_population -0.54 1.00       
dem_lev 0.02 -0.01 1.00      
inf_mort 0.26 0.05 -0.40 1.00     
fdi_stock 0.05 -0.13 0.04 0.04 1.00    
openness 0.12 -0.43 0.05 -0.36 0.24 1.00   
ln_ppp_gdpcap -0.31 -0.14 0.22 -0.78 -0.05 0.38 1.00  
gdp_growth -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.29 0.13 0.04 1.00 
hi_inc_imports -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.07 
Source: calculations of the author based on data from OECD (2012), WDI (2012) and Marshall et al. (2011) 
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Table 4. Estimation results of aid allocation regressions 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Random effects 
(3) 
Fixed effects 
(4) 
Fixed effects 
(5) 
Fixed effects 
(6) 
Fixed effects 
(7) 
Fixed effects 
(8) 
Fixed effects 
ln_populationt-1 -0.585*** 
(-20.818) 
-0.585*** 
(-10.292) 
-3.422*** 
(-2.712) 
-3.409** 
(-2.425) 
-3.425*** 
(-2.707) 
-2.544*** 
(-2.979) 
-3.432*** 
(-2.699) 
-3.416*** 
(-2.693) 
dem_levt-2 0.025*** 
(3.033) 
0.027* 
(1.785) 
0.016 
(1.340) 
0.017 
(1.252) 
0.016 
(1.300) 
0.013 
(1.185) 
0.019 
(1.397) 
0.012 
(1.070) 
any_demt-1 0.262** 
(2.509) 
0.260*** 
(2.669) 
0.250** 
(2.508) 
0.292*** 
(2.711) 
0.254** 
(2.524) 
0.224** 
(2.432) 
0.252** 
(2.529) 
- 
multiparty t-1 - - - - - - - 0.186** 
(2.127) 
inf_mortt-1 -0.001 
(-0.489) 
0.000 
(0.068) 
-0.008 
(-1.476) 
-0.007 
(-1.027) 
-0.007 
(-1.251) 
-0.007 
(-1.321) 
-0.008 
(-1.531) 
-0.008 
(-1.378) 
colony 0.036 
(0.263) 
-0.079 
(-0.323) 
- - - - - - 
fdi_stockt-1 -0.003*** 
(-3.789) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.717) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.018) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.840) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.033) 
-0.001 
(-0.710) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.069) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.858) 
opennesst-1 0.004*** 
(2.926) 
0.004** 
(2.425) 
0.005** 
(2.434) 
0.003 
(1.093) 
0.005** 
(2.267) 
0.003 
(1.518) 
0.005** 
(2.449) 
0.005** 
(2.540) 
africa 
0.135 
(1.132) 
0.244 
(0.823) 
- - - - - - 
latin_am 
0.458*** 
(2.943) 
0.290 
(0.859) 
- - - - - - 
europe 
0.946*** 
(4.266) 
0.860** 
(2.483) 
- - - - - - 
mena 
0.824*** 
(4.393) 
0.445 
(1.013) 
- - - - - - 
Israel 
3.676*** 
(13.549) 
3.292*** 
(7.736) 
- - - - - - 
Egypt 
2.167*** 
(10.664) 
2.145*** 
(6.189) 
- - - - - - 
ln_ppp_gdpcapt-
1 
-0.945*** 
(-9.602) 
-0.787*** 
(-4.485) 
-0.723*** 
(-3.225) 
-0.941*** 
(-2.844) 
-0.758*** 
(-3.263) 
-0.739** 
(-2.591) 
-0.730*** 
(-3.208) 
-0.725*** 
(-3.131) 
gdp_growtht-1 0.006 
(0.862) 
0.004 
(0.629) 
-0.002 
(-0.230) 
-0.006 
(-0.470) 
-0.003 
(-0.337) 
0.004 
(0.537) 
-0.001 
(-0.166) 
-0.003 
(-0.332) 
hi_inc_importst-1 0.008*** 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.002 
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(3.167) (1.484) (0.226) (0.818) (0.201) (1.024) (0.264) (0.209) 
inv_prott-1 - - - -0.008 
(-0.232) 
- - - - 
conflict - - - - -0.032 
(-1.486) 
- - - 
military exp - - - - - -0.002 
(-0.154) 
- - 
cold_war*any_d
em 
- - - - - - 0.255 
(1.270) 
- 
constant 18.861*** 
(23.841) 
17.534*** 
(10.533) 
64.237*** 
(3.020) 
66.492*** 
(2.656) 
64.657*** 
(3.023) 
50.183*** 
(3.321) 
64.414*** 
(3.004) 
64.175*** 
(2.998) 
N 917 917 917 671 908 746 917 917 
R
2
 0.57 0.54 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.34 
Notes: ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. T-statistics shown in parentheses. All models estimated with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors. Models include period dummies (not reported), which are jointly significant in all cases at the 1% level. 
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Table 5. Estimation results of aid allocation regressions 
 (9) 
Fixed effects 
(10) 
Fixed effects 
(11) 
Fixed effects 
(12) 
Fixed effects 
(13) 
Fixed effects 
(14) 
Fixed effects 
ln_populationt-1 -3.424*** 
(-2.713) 
-3.069*** 
(-2.622) 
-3.797*** 
(-3.653) 
-3.498*** 
(-2.711) 
-3.394*** 
(-2.712) 
-3.457*** 
(-2.741) 
dem_levt-2 0.017 
(1.344) 
- - 
0.021 
(1.483) 
0.022 
(1.610) 
0.021 
(1.519) 
dem_levt-3 - 
0.005 
(0.413) 
- - - - 
dem_levt-6 - - 0.022 
(1.893) 
- - - 
major_demt-1 0.307*** 
(2.617) 
0.245** 
(2.236) 
0.227** 
(2.074) 
0.181* 
(1.915) 
0.310*** 
(2.622) 
0.296** 
(2.455) 
major_demt-2 - 
0.202 
(1.355) 
0.315*** 
(2.665) 
- - - 
major_demt-3 - - 0.354*** 
(2.999) 
- - - 
major_demt-4 - - 0.287** 
(2.075) 
- - - 
major_demt-5 - - 0.218 
(1.523) 
- - - 
small_dem t-1 0.172 
(1.224) 
0.182 
(1.308) 
0.074 
(0.862) 
0.186 
(1.316) 
0.172 
(1.207) 
0.190 
(1.349) 
small_dem t-2 - 
0.083 
(0.769) 
0.137 
(1.497) 
- - - 
small_dem t-3 - - 
0.276*** 
(3.142) 
- - - 
small_dem t-4 - - 
0.168* 
(1.761) 
- - - 
small_dem t-5 - - 
0.192* 
(1.806) 
- - - 
dem_revers t-1 - - - - 
-0.299** 
(-2.475) 
-0.279** 
(-2.286) 
major_dem*africa 
- - - 
-0.116 
(-1.012) 
- - 
major_dem *latin_am 
- - - 
0.301** 
(1.986) 
- - 
major_dem *europe 
- - - 
0.802* 
(1.773) 
- - 
major_dem *mena 
- - - 
0.602*** 
(3.800) 
- - 
inf_mortt-1 -0.008 
(-1.462) 
-0.011* 
(-1.929) 
-0.009* 
(-1.782) 
-0.008 
(-1.402) 
-0.007 
(-1.324) 
-0.006 
(-1.034) 
fdi_stockt-1 -0.002*** 
(-2.924) 
-0.002** 
(-2.469) 
-0.001 
(-0.403) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.921) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.870) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.849) 
opennesst-1 0.005** 
(2.410) 
0.003* 
(1.740) 
0.003 
(1.580) 
0.004** 
(2.270) 
0.004** 
(2.200) 
0.004** 
(2.106) 
ln_ppp_gdpcapt-1 -0.722*** 
(-3.193) 
-0.704*** 
(-2.848) 
-0.370** 
(-2.091) 
-0.741*** 
(-3.178) 
-0.724*** 
(-3.184) 
-0.791*** 
(-3.285) 
gdp_growtht-1 -0.002 
(-0.216) 
-0.003 
(-0.391) 
0.000 
(0.149) 
-0.001 
(-0.135) 
-0.003 
(-0.351) 
-0.005 
(-0.566) 
hi_inc_importst-1 0.002 
(0.226) 
0.006 
(0.766) 
0.006 
(0.963) 
0.003 
(0.378) 
0.001 
(0.186) 
0.001 
(0.082) 
conflict 
- - - - - 
-0.047* 
(-1.853) 
constant 64.250*** 
(3.021) 
58.476*** 
(2.931) 
65.173*** 
(3.657) 
65.520*** 
(3.010) 
63.754*** 
(3.023) 
65.443*** 
(3.059) 
N 917 822 2,389 917 917 908 
R
2
 0.34 0.33 0.82 0.34 0.34 0.33 
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Notes: ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. T-statistics shown in 
parentheses. All models estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors. Models include period dummies (not reported), 
which are jointly significant in all cases at the 1% level. 
